Paul Lendvai, One Day that Shook Communist World, The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and its Legacy, Princeton UP 2008

Impenetrability of Hungarian language makes it nearly impossible for the outsider to study the 1956 revolution objectively. The book by Lendvai is quite interesting but I cannot understand how accurate it is. Largest contribution of his study seems to be his nuanced assessment of Janoscz Kadar, a leader installed by the Soviets during the coup. First, unlike most other emigre studies, Lendvai senses that his participation was much, much more active than simply being a Soviet puppet. In particular, he blames Nagy's execution squarely on Kadar and his influence. "Kadarism," i.e. an attempt to balance socialism, nationalism, preservation of independent statehood and the demands by his Soviet overlords is an interesting phenomenon and Lendvai pioneers objective research here. Many other Eastern Bloc leaders (Dubchek, Egon Krenz, Gomulka, Kania, Yaruzelski) tried to follow in his footsteps but none succeeded to the degree Kadar did. The book speaks very little of internecine struggles within the revolutionary camp and glosses over the Oct. 30 massacre at the Communist Party Headquarters and other atrocities of the rebels.Internal factionalism seems to be the major cause of the failure of the rebellion. E.g. Hungarian service of Radio Free Europe, probably packed by ex-Nazies, by its broadcasts tried to undermine Nagy's regime, i.e. the core of the resistance, which it considered "red." Moreover, after the failure of the rebellion they continued to lie that the resistance was still active in the mountains and some duped refugees returned to continue armed struggle only to be shot or sent to the camps. Hungarian army was surprisingly passive in the event of the Soviet invasion, especially the Air Force. This author thinks that the peasant soldiery had little good to expect from the rebels promising bloody vengeance to the occupiers of landlords' estates-- a unique feature of this Revolution was extremely violent, conservative, pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic sloganeering of its organizers-- and the Air Force was mostly Soviet-trained. Only few higher officers mostly associated with the previous Horthy regime (Maliter, Kiraly) were active in the revolution. According to Lendvai, the most active combat detachments were worker-student guards, yet, their organizer Dudas (probably, a Romanian Jew) was twice arrested by right wingers during this period. The overall toll of victims is such: several tens shot by the Soviet-organized tribunals, ~700 Soviet soldiers and 1000-2000 rebels killed in the storming of Budapest, unnamed number of the Communist Party, secret police members and Soviet advisers massacred by the rebels, 41,000 participants were imprisoned (28,000 in labor camps) and uncertain number escaped abroad (from low 15,000 in Lendvai to accepted 100-200,000, though the difference may be that Lendvai counted only the active participants in the rebellion, not the general refugees). My verdict: failed Hungarian Revolution of 1956 still is not sufficiently clarified in its political, military and humanitarian aspects but Lendvai's book is a good start.