Gunther Holbl. A History of Ptolemaic Empire. Routledge. Taylor & Francis.

Since recently, English translations cannot be considered true to an original. For instance, atrocities of the Austrian Army against Serbs and the victories of the Russian Army on the Austrian theater were largely censored out from the fundamental Der Ersten Weltkrieg under the guise of shortening.

Grand--and very terse--compilation of Gunther Holbl,  A Ptolemaic Empire cannot contain the issues unwelcome by the American Neocon PC crowd controlling large New York and London publishing houses. Yet, the quality of translation is despicable. The words whose meaning Tina Saavedra obviously does not know appear in bizarre mixture of Latin, Greek  and German terms (heretofore "kleruchic", etc.--Acting as basileus, Antiochos imposed a prostagma on the kleruchoi of Fayum, etc.), i.e. Seleucid King Antiochos in his temporary capacity of a King of Egypt (commonly named pharaoh--A. Bl.) commanded tenant farmers of Fayum... Do you suppose to understand anything from this translation? Furthermore, the index is small--a typical feature of a European book--and the words like prostagma never enter in it.

But the work Prof. Holbl conducted to comprehend and put in the cultural context this most important period of Egyptian history is commendable. In particular, he demonstrated conscious and unconscious fusion of Hellenistic and Egyptian traditions during the Ptolemaic period. From his study, it emerges that most Ptolemies were indifferent generals--who won only one large battle of Rahia but could not exploit it politically--but capable diplomats and civil administrators. The role of the dynastic women in conducting policy was unique in the ancient and, probably, much of the modern world.

Tim Marshall. Prisoners of geography.

Despite the domination of neoconservatism in academic and political circles, neocon-lit rarely enjoys popularity. This is because neocons themselves are heavily infused with Straussianism and Strauss-speak--including Greek quotations--contains too many words to be understood by an average racist rube, be he a rolexed, ferraried currency trader from New York or a truck-driving red neck from Peoria. Only on the pages of "Foreign Affairs" their stupidities appear in all their ornate vacuity. Tim Marshall succeeded if one considers New York Times bestseller list a success--but only a few current books containing elaborate racist vituperation against Russia can avoid this fate.

To bridge the gap between the "core" audiences and the high priests of the Neocon, Tim Marshall, a retired Sky News hack, wrote his opus. In it, he upholds the idea of upcoming (or continuing) American five hundred years Reich but not to the victorious tune of the Kagans--who mercifully cut it in half with respect to the original Reich--but using platitudes and jokes as the last refuge of the "patriot." Namely, he proclaims that the eternity of American domination on this Earth is predicated by the famous Bismarck's maxim about "fools, drunks, babies and Americans."

Into this mess, he adds crap statistics how many US universities and banks are in the top ten (twenty, etc.). The first list is heavily skewed in favor of Anglo-Saxon educational systems. But, undoubtedly the US is a current leader in higher education. Yet, if one were to compile this list 100 years ago, probably, most universities in the list would be German, with a small tinge of French, British and Austro-Hungarian. In early 90s, the list of the largest world banks was heavily overpopulated by the Japanese banks. Have you heard about Second Japanese Economic Miracle? In the early XX century, the largest world exchanges were New York, London but also St. Petersburg and Buenos Aires. But autarkic economic experiments of the two last reduced them to insignificance. As they say in asset management, "past performance does not guarantee future results."

Kurt M. Campbell. The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia.

This is one of the first, feeble attempts of the American political establishment to come out of the lair of neoconservative thinking. Remarkably, the title contains "American statecraft", rather than a conventional "American power." Finally, and belatedly there is a recognition that after the end of the Cold War there could be countries with independent political sphere of influence, which even mighty United States must take into account. Fukuyama/Nye orthodoxy still disseminated by all International Relations departments simply denies this in favor of eternal American Imperium. Yet, there is nothing eternal in politics.

On Picketty. Piketty, T., Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Belknap, 2014

      Both the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of the 2000s were preceded by the period of frenetic economic activity, creating many extremely wealthy people. Yet, their reactions to the situation of mass unemployment and industrial stagnation were diametrically different. In 1929 Joseph Kennedy? said that he would gladly give up half of his fortune to protect another half, obviously, from impending deterioration if the crisis continues. The reaction of the new rich to the very modest steps to deal with the 2007-2008 could be summarized in hedge mogul Shwartzman, who compared the possibility of ending “carried interest” tax exemption for hedge fund managers to Hitler’s invasion of Poland.

The growth of inequality in the US is confirmed by all statistical metrics and there is a significant discussion as to what to do with it (or whether it is a new normal). Very thick, 700-pages volume on this subject by Thomas Piketty became a bestseller—a rarity for political economy.

        Yet, there is a surprisingly little discussion of why it is bad. Inequality can be compared with obesity or climate change—when asked what system of organism/society suffers from it—the answer is “all”, so few take it seriously.
       Certainly, there are anecdotal examples of heavily overweight sedentary alcoholics living past ninety and health and fitness jocks croaking at half that age. But, on the average, damage to one’s health from excessive weight is undisputable. Because the discussion of particular damage to society by extreme inequality inevitably runs as the analogue of the above example, I only remind the sticky end to which extremely unequal societies (further EUS) eventually succumbed through human history.

First, it seems that nearly all EUS become excessively militarized. Why the universal result of EUS is militarization is beyond the scope of discussion of my column and is better left to professional historians. Probably, there are many economic and cultural causes working in the same direction. The most obvious is that extreme prosperity enjoyed by the EUS elites attracts outsiders: not always in terms of invasions but also resettlement. Germanic tribes, which terrorized Europe for the next millennium, initially appeared in the Roman Empire as settlers flying from Hun and Avar depredations (don’t tell this to Donald).

        The twentieth century brought with it picture of mass upheavals as workers and peasants marching with rifles under red banners. This picture is outdated, nor was it the prevalent mode of internal/class conflict in human history. Currently, we observe mass migration from the war-torn Middle East to Western Europe. There is also small, but measurable flux of “migrants” from developed countries to the Middle East, to join ISIS and other extremist groups. These volunteers predominantly grew up in conditions of wealthy secular societies, yet they stream to the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia to fan the flames of the civil wars bound to bring more huddled masses to the European shores. Thus, peaceful resettlement and armed uprising walk hand in hand.

“Militarization” should not be understood narrowly as a numerical growth of an army. For instance, European medieval society which replaced exemplary EUS of the Roman Empire was probably, one of the most militarized societies in history, given that most administrative, economic and even some ecclesiastical functions (think of armed monastic orders) were performed by armored cavalrymen. Yet they were puny, not only in absolute numbers but also in proportion to the overall population.

Militarization of the US police does not require special explanation beyond a single word: “Ferguson.” Police imitates military techniques and equipment and eventually begins to treat general population as an occupied enemy to be controlled rather than citizenry whom they must protect.
Militarization of intelligence services requires slightly more comment. Traditionally intelligence operated under makeshift rules but resorted to deadly violence very sparingly. On the contrary, the whole purpose of uniformed military is to kill opponents. However, during the centuries, the armies developed extensive rules and rituals, which are supported by elaborate command structures and draconian punishments for noncompliance. An alternative would be Late-Medieval-Early Modern European warfare or many modern African conflicts. Fictionalized portrayal can be gleaned from the “Game of Thrones.” I.e. these armies were gangs of looters and rapists who occasionally participated in combat. I remind those, who think it is an irrelevant ancient history that the Third Amendment to the US Constitution—part of the school program—is a relic of the jolly times when quartering of own troops was scarcely less a misfortune than a foreign occupation.

Current involvement of CIA in the drone warfare and other military-style special ops completely blurred the distinction between lawless but relatively non-violent professional intelligence and rule-abiding violence by the organized military. Henceforth, I will refer to “the military” as a term not relating exclusively to the uniformed army but also to the whole plethora of paramilitary organizations flourishing on the body of EUS.
At the second stage of unraveling, a captain or general of these armed forces suddenly decides that instead of him serving fat cats, they might be serving him. One helpful hint being provided that in the EUS, the (constantly fighting) military remains the only ladder for social advancement. Napoleonic habit of putting hands behind his tunic, ostensibly to hide his worn gloves in the military school provided him a subtle reminder of his inferior class origins for all his life.

In the modern American society wealth and power became the only criterion of social success. And everyone who is not constantly on the TV screen is a “loser.” It was not always that way. Obviously, in the 60s, A secretive NASA researcher or nuclear physicist possessed higher social prestige than a banker or a stand-up comedian. Moreover, banker's salaries (compared to the rocket scientist and laughable by the modern standards) were considered kind-of compensation considered tedium of the former and exciting character of work of the latter.

In their time and age, Newton and Voltaire were independently wealthy—mostly from market speculations and not from their writings —but Leibnitz, Kant and Mendelsohn, being of modest means-- were nevertheless treated as a minor royalty.  Especially, when material wealth gets intertwined with an elite education—predominantly with the degrees from a top dozen schools in business, law, political sciences or communications—a constantly fighting military provides the only opportunity for the ambitious members of the lower classes to advance.

The third stage of this power play may be different though the not-always-exclusive scenarios below provide some guidance.
• Generals succeed in hanging on to power. Napoleon’s example produced several hundred of his imitators not only in Latin America but also in other parts of the world.

• The populace, usually after a period of anarchy, buoyed by disgruntled soldiery from the lost wars, overthrows the generals and instead declares loyalty to the group of extremist ideologues (Russia—1917-1922, Germany—1918-1933, China—1911-1949). This scenario may yet realize in Iraq and Syria.

• Organized state completely dissolves into sections of the competing armed gangs—a scenario favored by Hollywood anti-utopias. Contemporary examples are Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and large swaths of Pakistan, Southern Sudan and Eritrea.

Now, take your pick.

Russian defense industry: first postscript

Below is the excerpt of Putin's interview from April, 14 concerning the problems of defense industry. 

В. Путин: И именно поэтому – или в том числе поэтому – вынуждены даже были построить два новых завода по производству этой техники. Даже можно сказать, три, на одном из них я недавно был. до нужных кондиций. Работа продолжается.

............................................

Ю.Кузнецов: Я Кузнецов Юрий Николаевич, начальник сборочного цеха тяжёлых машин. Мой вопрос наверняка интересует всех оборонщиков. В настоящее время у нас много заказов, много работы. Мы покупаем новую технику, к нам пришло очень много молодёжи. Но в последнее время участились разговоры о том, что надо сокращать гособоронзаказ. Не получится ли так, что мы останемся без работы и нам, как в 90-е, придётся осваивать производство кастрюль, сковородок, прочей бытовой техники?

В.Путин: Да, это непраздный вопрос. Но первое, что я хочу Вам сказать: гособоронзаказ не сокращается. Мы сокращаем, действительно, бюджетирование Министерства обороны и некоторых, да практически всех, силовых ведомств. Да, мы это делаем в связи с известными бюджетными ограничениями. И это абсолютно естественная вещь в современных условиях.

Мы должны поджать аппетиты силовых ведомств так же, как мы поджимаем и аппетиты ведомств гражданских. Нужно повышать эффективность использования бюджетных ресурсов. Но эти ограничения касаются текущей деятельности, хочу это подчеркнуть, текущей деятельности, а не гособоронзаказа. Гособоронзаказ должен быть и будет исполнен в полном объёме.

Но Вы правы абсолютно в том, что пик заказов, пик загрузки предприятий как раз сейчас, на следующий год, через год, потом он будет снижаться по мере комплектования наших Вооружённых Сил новейшими образцами техники, которые должны быть доведены до 70 процентов. И, конечно, встанет вопрос о том, чем загружать дальше?

Разумеется, об этом нужно подумать именно сейчас, и не только нам, но и вам. Нужно думать о конверсии предприятий. В ходе переоснащения оборонных предприятий современной техникой, в целом около трёх триллионов рублей предусмотрено на это, мы исходим из того, что будет закуплено такое оборудование, которое можно будет использовать и в рамках конверсионной работы будущего. Может быть, есть смысл делать мягко исполнение самого гособоронзаказа, подвинув некоторые позиции, что называется, вправо. Кстати говоря, мы так и делаем, но без всякого его сокращения.

The main remaining problem of the Russian defense-industrial complex (see the author's) is "workforce hoarding", which is partly a result of gigantic geographic spread of the Russian defense industries inherited from the USSR and excessive concentration of the defense-industrial establishment in Moscow and the environs. For instance, Russian holding company "Rostech" controls 15(!) diversified companies, of which only one, the  КРЭТ has nearly 20 enterprises including a college in six or seven geographic locations, more than half of them in, and around Moscow. 

Putin must have responded not in the sense that the Government will not cut procurement defense spending in the future, but that there are two main strategies defense industries must apply themselves. One is consolidation, the second is relocation of defense enterprises from Moscow where the cost of land, energy and the workforce is the highest. Certainly, one has to pay a stiff premium to a worker to relocate to the provinces and this is not the answer. The answer is that dedicated "weaponeers" are only a minority of defense workers. Accountants, secretaries, electricians, plumbers, programmers, etc. constitute the bulk of the workforce. Key experts can be provided with temporary, but comfortable housing outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg and ample holidays, with the understanding that all subsequent hiring of specialists has to be locally sourced.

Consolidation on the already existing sites can also relieve problems with equipment and reduce the need for the new construction (see first paragraph of the interview excerpt). The last thing the Russian Federal budget needs is a new capital construction. 

Jane Mayer. Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right.

I did not read the book but I listened to presentation of Jane Mayer on NPR. It is good, much better than the sycophantic opus by Daniel Shulman. But Jane Mayer seems to share with the latter belief in sincerity of Koch brothers' "libertarian" convictions. From her description, they rather stand as psychopaths wishing that the human race would not outlive them for too much.

Sarah Blackwell. At the existentialist cafe.

The well-written book tells you next to nothing about existentialist philosophy and its influence on XX century culture but plenty about the characters involved. One sentence: "It is the single documented example I have come across of Heidegger actually doing something nice" (asking a bookseller to prominently display Paul Celan's book before his visit to town) is worth the price of admission.

P.S. Now you understand where James Dean comes from. 

Juliet Barker. 1381. The Year of the Peasants' Revolt.

A nicely written piece of historical fantasy, in the spirit of Game of Thrones. Her late 14th century English commoners live to their late fifties despite three large waves of bubonic plague and staggering death rate at childbirth, eat hi-protein diets straight from a London supermarket, understand the connection between infection and bodily hygiene and some even have indoor plumbing. Did I forget domestic servants saving to buy stone houses? Strict enforcement of municipal edicts in an almost illiterate society? She herself mentions that an ability to read a psalm by heart was considered a sufficient evidence of clerical vocation.  Barker announces an entirely different popular image of the Middle Ages "a nineteenth-century invention."

There is little explanation how this squares with (a well-documented) meager yields of crops (1:3-1:5) in Medieval England and other mainstream economic histories. If there was such a disparity in the living conditions between Late Medieval British Isles and the rest of the world (including lands with much more temperate climes), what is the particular reason?

Her book can be read as a page-turning novel but given her fast and loose treatment of facts (an army of 36,000 French facing 6,000 English at Agincourt based on a single line of pro-British historian) I cannot say how accurate it is.