Sunday, April 27, 2014

Robert Gates. Duty: Memoirs of Secretary at War.





It is easy to name leaders who successfully covered up their true face and whose incompetence and/or viciousness were fully revealed only at the pinnacle of their career. The inverse: the development when a previously incompetent, debauched or vicious leader became elevated by the obligations of the high office is so rare that only two examples: Louis XI and Duke Wellington come to mind. Sheer antiquity of these examples testify to their rareness. Louis XI turned from debauched and treacherous youth into a frugal and conscientious king, the founder of a modern French state who engineered the rebirth of the country after Hundred Years War. The winner at Waterloo Arthur Wellesley, Duke Wellington was an indifferent cadet nearly cashiered from the military.

          Robert Gates belongs to this rare category. He was controversial (see Iran-Contra) Bush nominee to the directorship of CIA famous for his terrible errors of judgement. He refused to recognize ongoing collapse of USSR and gave advice not to deal with Yeltsin but also suggested to Mideastern leaders declaring "jihad" to edge Soviets from Afghanistan on the basis of "infidels occupying Moslem lands" not foreseeing that this formula can be equally applied against the USA.

           Yet, his tenure as the Secretary of Defense was an unqualified success. He did not only oversaw conclusion of Iraq War and wrapping up operations of Afghanistan but also was a sane voice on American intervention into Georgia (which he acknowledges as erstwhile attackers and blames Russians for invasion of Georgia on neighboring pages) and Syria.

            His memoirs accused of criticism of a sitting President whom he served are obviously a first volley in his fight for something big (Republican vice-presidential nomination or Secretary of State in the next administration). And, given the above, he might as well be successful in this new role.

Saturday, April 26, 2014

Stuart Freedman. Strategy.

Typical English manuscript, which treats war as a sporting event (or high drama, see his Conclusions), in which one is settling scores. 700+ pages of erudite but very disjoint banter. How many pages one needs to ruminate on a correct (and rather trivial) idea that human behavior is too complex to mold it into a set of predetermined rules? There is a second idea, that action, in societal terms, is moot without proper organization on the basis of strategy. If there is something else, I have missed it.
        The author presents himself as well-intent, erudite and pious man but he is completely incapable to make his thought concise and precise. It is very ironic that a person who extols virtues of organization and discipline is incapable to exercise these himself.

Orlando Figes. Russian Revolution 1891-1991.

Researched on the level of 5th grade school report, all from downloads. Even proper names of political/government offices get garbled (O'K, this is pedantry for US professional historian). There is obviously secret subsidy paid (by USAID? EU?) for russophobe screeds because ALL of them get published instead of one in tenfold number of copies.

Craig Nelson. The Age of Prosperity. The Epicrise and Dramatic Fall of the Atomic Era.

Rank (not so much incompetent, as secondary) compilation. Publishing industry becomes a feeding trough for upper-middle class New Yorkese and Angelenos who do not have enough criminal inclinations to make it in banking and/or electronic media.