Saturday, April 27, 2024

Robert Darnton. The Revolutionary Temper. Paris 1748-1789.

      


      Harvard doyen Robert Darnton's book about seething unrest leading to the French Revolution is quite a good reading. Political, economic and administrative realities of the French society serve only as a frame to describe the changes in public opinion, his specialty. 

    The picture of the French society he describes in his book -- without expounding on that -- hints at the causes of the French Revolution as incompatible divergences of the political elites. And these were four: the court, the (upper) clergy, the executive -- the ministers and the Parliaments. Each had its sets of publicists to support their positions. Incongruously, but consistent with American academic tradition, Darnton describes these medieval institutions, the Parliaments, as democracy in action. But he honestly shows that they were largely defenders of entrenched interests of the urban upper classes. Even in one case -- the absolution of the Jansenists -- in which Parliaments were seemingly on the side of the freedom of the press and consciousness, they were defending Jansenism. But it became a superstition long ago, contrasting with a "more enlightened" views of the upper clergy. 

     At the same time, Gallican Church, or at least her upper echelons were more and more entrenched in their Ultramontanism and complete inflexibility, first and foremost, with respect to their own taxation. 

      The most progressive part of the elite were the ministries but they were hamstrung by the court intrigues and the laziness and the indecision of both kings, Louis XV and Louis XVI. Because of the parochial interests of the Parliaments they had to introduce reforms by "tyrannical" (compared with the French Revolution -- ha-ha) methods. 

     The weakness of Darnton's book -- henceforth it cannot replace the classics of De Tocqueville "The Old Regime and the Revolution" and Edgar Faure's "La disgrace de Turgot" -- that all the problems are sorted out from the point of view of Parisian educated middle class. The ones that could afford to pay 9 livres for a literary pamphlet and subscribe to the "Gazette de Leyde" -- his favorite broadsheet source and the barometer of the public opinion.  

Wednesday, April 17, 2024

Emma Southon. A Rome of One's Own: The Forgotten Women of the Roman Empire.

   This is an odd work of a Christian Feminism. Modern wokeism tinged it with replacement of slaves by the "enslaved people", though I cannot figure out why the latter is better than the former. Furthermore, "enslaved" does not indicate whether people in question were enslaved during their lifetimes, or were born as slaves. 

    But the book only proves the point that Hellenistic, including Roman, women played no role in state politics. Few exceptions only underline the message. If we exclude semi-legendary women of the Kingly Rome, like Tarpeia and Queen Tanaquil in her book, the only women who actively participated in big political decisions were Severan, i.e. Syrian/Balkan women: Julia Domna, Julia Maesa and Julia Mamaea described by Southon in one of the chapters. A Christian princess Galla Placidia, in another chapter, played a great role in Rome's final demise but this was because of her decision to side with the Goths against her Empire. If one adds to them a treacherous, murderous last wife of Augustus, Empress Livia, or so she is shown in "I, Claudius", the list will be over. 

    So the outrageous remark of one of the 1960s professors that delivering a lecture course on Roman women will be like delivering a course on Roman dogs does not seem so outlandish after all. Women, Roman, or otherwise, Etruscan, British, etc. played a great role in the life of the Roman society, which Dr. Southon shows quite clearly -- with the ample use of obscenities and allusions on the English popular culture, some of which I cannot understand -- but their political influence was negligible. 

Monday, April 15, 2024

William Burns for "Foreign Policy"

 The magazine "Communist" in the Soviet times, despite a visible thickness and demagoguery of its articles, performed a very important function. Through it, the Party and Government leadership as well as a few highly-placed propagandists explained and inculcated current policies of the Party and Government to the masses of its functionaries. Without teeth-crunching studies of the "Communist" articles during special workshops and Party meetings, the functionaries would be left without a guiding light on a frequently changing and, sometimes, contradictory Party policies. 

    Currently, the Washington blob, uses "Foreign Policy" for essentially the same purposes. But the pronouncements, which can easily emerge from large and empty heads of Blinken and Nuland, look really odd when coming from William J. Burns, the only remaining foreign policy whiz in the Biden administration. Basically, it affirms the triumph of Bushism-Bidenism: a complete merger of the foreign and military-intelligence policies with no place for diplomatic conflict resolution and/or mutually beneficial economic cooperation. 

    In his article, Burns advocates a complete destruction of Russian Federation and the reduction of China to semi-colonial status, as the implicit goals of American foreign policy. It is hard to imagine many Russians or Chinese agree with that agenda or not employing every resource to forestall this conclusion. In fact, since the first enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe in 1998, the American polity was steadily degrading into something very much resembling a traditional Eastern European or Latin American society. We now have domination of the moneyed elite, political parties, which do not recognize the legitimacy of each other and freely appropriate any instrument of control. That includes secret police methods to displace the opponent, kangaroo courts, judging entirely on their political persuasion and ignoring the law, universal surveillance by the police, secret blacklisting, etc. etc. So the unrestrained imperialism of the neocons was hurtful to the majority of the US population. 

   But the most risible is the suggestion that CIA is "totally unpolitical". English language has a distinction between "politics" and "policy", which is not translated to adverbial usage. If the "policy" meaning is in question, than everything what CIA does is "political". If the meaning of (un)political is derived from "politics" then what can he say about the infamous, Blinken-inspired letter of a hundred or so intelligence operatives claiming that information from Hunter Biden's notebook bears "classic features of Russian disinformation". As if Russian intelligence could monitor repair and recycling of laptops in all of the United States. 

  Again, I do not think for a second that Mr. Burns believes in such stupidities. But the fact that he must repeat them to occupy positions of power in today's Washington sheds a dark light on the current state of the US politics. In whichever meaning you take it. 

Saturday, April 13, 2024

David Graeber, David Wengrow. The Dawn of Everything.

 In a book of a such overwhelming ambition there have to be problems. And there was no lack of criticism poured on Graeber and Wengrow. Yet, there is no doubt that untimely deceased Graeber was the mind of the first magnitude. His wonderful "Bullshit Jobs" exposed the fragility of the modern civilization with unparalleled alacrity. 

 The main thesis of Graeber and Wengrow is that the modern nation-state was not an inevitable product of the development of civilization. Furthermore, the last 500 years when this form of organization became dominant is a small blip on the overall history of humanity. 

    The mainstream progression of the history of human civilization accepted by the Western historians is strangely similar to the concept proposed by Friedrich Engels, the main collaborator of Karl Marx, and enshrined in bronze by Stalin (actually, by his court historians). With world popularity of Yuval Harari, it is unassailable. Namely, once their were hunter-gatherer (forager, in more modern terminology) societies build on a more or less uniform template. At some point, some of them progressed to chiefdoms, started agriculture and cities. Agricultural society begot hierarchies in the form of the rulers and the ruled and widespread enslavement. First civilizations were built by the slave labor. There were two main forms of the developed statehood--slave-owning Empires of the West--Hellenistic and Roman--and the "oriental despotism" based on the uniform conscription of the labor force by the state. 

  After the fall of the Roman Empire, the Germanic states formed in its wake, reworked its slave owning system into something called "feudalism". At the sunset of the Middle Ages, the national monarchies began to form, which started to transform into nation states and so it went till the "End of History" declared by Fukuyama after the Cold War. 

    Not only this scheme was Eurocentric but also it omitted the societies, in which the majority of the human race lived most of the time. In fact, after the falls of the Roman, Parthian Empires, India's Guptas and China Han dynasties, their former populations were somehow organized, and their organization was not identical to the previous, only on a smaller scale. Nomadic peoples populated all Eurasia from east of Hungary to the north of Korean border. Native American societies were a completely different story altogether. 

    The main "discovery" of Graeber--still contested--was that prehistoric societies had a variety of forms of social organization. Even societies with the same mode of production, fisheries, in case of his studies, had a vastly different template. Northwestern tribes had chieftains, noble hierarchies and enslavement, with little role for women. Northern California tribes were more egalitarian with women playing a significant role (I wonder whether a current difference between California and Alaska politics had anything to do with his vision😏). But altogether this is highly probable that foraging societies had as much difference in their political organization as the modern nation-states. For, if the template was uniform, how it happened that it evolved in so many unrelated social units?

Death of Graeber in the beginning of the COVID epidemic is an unreconcilable blow to the anthropology and humanities in general.