Stephen Kotkin, Stalin Vol. 1

This book is so squeezed by ideological strictures emanating from the Hoover Institution Party Committee that it is completely schizophrenic in terms of its worldview and it ends more as a negative mirror image of Stalinist mythology than a historical study.

First, there is only one successful model of society, namely Anglo-American "neoliberal" capitalism and all recipes of social reform are only as successful as they imitate this model (see Fukuyama and the rest of the crowd).

Second, Russians is the nation of drunken brutes possessing no creativity or energy. This is now a symbol of faith uniting all media starting with NPR and ending with Fox News.

Henceforth, if USSR could successfully resolve some of its problems, it could be attributed only to superhuman will and foresight of its Georgian tyrant, Iosip Bessarionovich Jugashvili, aka Stalin. Following this absurd legend, Kotkin singles out Stalin as a leading force behind the rise of Communist Party much earlier than the mainstream historians but in full accordance with Stalinist propaganda initiated with Lavrentii Beria's ghostwritten "History of Communist Organizations in Transcaucasia."

Wherever there are factual inconsistencies in his narrative, Kotkin declares them fakes and forgeries. For instance, he declares Lenin's testament as fake written by Nadezhda Krupskaya, his wife. While nobody can be sure to what degree Lenin ever was in control of his faculties c. 1923, the testament bears striking resemblance in proposed solutions and style to his contemporary writings such as "How to reorganize Workers-Peasant Inspection." Were they also forged and for whatever purpose?

Kotkin fully subscribes to the Stalinist propagandist dogma of "Stalin as the Lenin today." While certainly, Communist methods and ideas were common for Lenin and Stalin (as they were common also for Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin and Kirov not to speak of lesser comrades) two men hated each other and had deep differences in personality.

Because Russians by definition were absent of any creativity save artistic, he recalls Communist mythology of Imperial Russia as a medieval village (of course, Communists used this mythology to justify low living standards in the USSR). In fact, Imperial Russia was fifth or fourth industrial power in the world, which he grudgingly recognizes (and probably outstripped France by 1917 because alone of great European powers it experienced growth during WWI). Low rates of literacy and average lifespan compared to the European states are specious evidence because Russia's colonies were contingent to the core Imperial territory. If one were to compare not the Russian Empire to the British isles or the Continental France but their empires on the whole, the picture would probably be much similar. Literacy and longevity statistics of central gubernias of Russia probably were still lagging behind, though not as much, from the most developed of European nations but perfectly comparable to Austro-Hungary, its Western neighbor.

In keeping with Hoover Institution dogma on market economics, he unfavorably compares Soviet industrialization with Mussolini's Italy, which applied many market-based techniques, some well ahead of its time. True, but neither Italy, nor Pilsudsky's Poland, nor Ataturk's Turkey became self-sufficient industrial powers. Inability of Italy to arm and supply its own army during the WWII mightily contributed to the disillusionment of soldiery and the fall of the Fascist regime.

Evil Communists cannot (except Stalin and some less known "bourgeois deviants" like Sokolnikov) possess any positive qualities such as military prowess or organizational capacity. That's why he denigrates Trotsky, founder of the Red Army, and Dzherzinsky, the head of the Secret Police and Kuibushev, head of the Central Planning Body, the VSNKH. In fact, despite their brutality and ideological limitations, all three were highly efficient leaders.

Finally, when nothing works, he invokes blind luck, as in the case of the Great Depression, which alone, he claims, saved the USSR from collapse from the invasion of superior Western powers (such as Poland and Romania), which (the threat of invasion) he dismisses elsewhere as an example of Soviet paranoia.

While the 900+ pages of this opus magisterium contain enough amusing anecdotes to keep reading--not a small distinction--it should be read as a work of historical fiction rather than the outcome of scientific research and analysis.