Ответ русскому другу: «Почему так трудно дается реформа российской науки?»
А. С. Блиох
I. «Раздавите гадину!»
Écrasez l’infâme.
Voltaire
Самыми живучими советскими институтами оказались не КПСС и не КГБ, а колхозы, Союз Писателей и Академия Наук. Первые два учреждения не пережили великий и могучий; вторая пара тихо сгнила в девяностые, а Академия победоносно продолжает жить. Россия унаследовала организацию своей научной деятельности от Советского Союза, в котором она имела совершенно уникальный характер. А именно, ни в каком другом обществе наука не организована в
научно-исследовательские институты, в которых, допустим, эквивалент
генерал-лейтенанта от философии, или литературной критики, командует объединением философов от солдата до генерал-майора философии посредством штаба состоящего из полковников-философов...
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Friday, January 25, 2008
Saturday, January 19, 2008
Tom Segev. 1967: Israel, the War and the Year which transformed the Middle East, Metropolitan, New York
Tom Segev. 1967: Israel, the War and the Year which transformed the Middle East, Metropolitan, New York
ISBN-10: 0805070575
The description of the historical events of 1967 much more personable and politically sensible, yet less coherent than rather vengeful and score-settling Orem’s book.
ISBN-10: 0805070575
The description of the historical events of 1967 much more personable and politically sensible, yet less coherent than rather vengeful and score-settling Orem’s book.
Richard Sakwa. Putin. Russia’s Choice (Second Edition). Routledge, London, 2007
Richard Sakwa. Putin. Russia’s Choice (Second Edition). Routledge, London, 2007.
DK 510.763.S247 2007
ISBN 978-0-203-40766-3
Richard Sakwa needed to exculpate his sin (stating, with many caveats and excuses, that something positive can be possible in Russia), so he produced second edition of his book, re-written in extremely disdainful and haughty manner. He also purged the second edition of some of his rash 2004 pronouncements, for instance, that Russians given their problems in Chechnya look with shock and awe at the quick and easy victory achieved by American military in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The author, like the rest of the Kremlinologist tribe, uses oral sources only from fringe opposition groups: views of mainstream journalists or politicians are not given any credence or are dismissed as government propaganda. But these people (Kasparov, Kasyanov, etc.) perform exactly the same role vis-à-vis Russia as the pro-Moscow Communists played in the Western scene during the Cold War. I.e., for a small fee from a Big Brother, they provided informational fodder, which was subsequently recycled for domestic agitprop. In an inverted post-Cold War world, different American and EU agencies similarly pay, as they think, to dupe Russians but mainly manage to deceive their own policymakers.
Another, peculiarly Anglo-Saxon habit is to compare real conditions in Russia or other “barbarian” nations with some earthly paradise called Pepperland in Octopussy’s little garden beneath the waves, rather with similar situations in other nations, including one’s own. Nobody, who witnessed enthusiastic support by the “free media” of the Bush-Blair propaganda campaign to sell the Iraq war, must judge media freedoms in other lands as wanting.
Yet, Sakwa’s book stands above all the rest and still contains a lot of accurate information and valid insights. I can certainly agree with his conclusion that current constitutional arrangement is a stopgap measure and it may develop in different directions. Russian Constitution is 13 years old, the same age as American was at the beginning of Jefferson Presidency. Practically every state, which came out of totalitarian past (Germany, Italy, Japan) had, for the protracted period, or has “one-and-a-half” party system, moreover, the duration of this semi-monopoly was inversely proportional to the level of development of democratic institutions before the dictatorship. The near future of Russian political system will depend on whether Russia’s Unity will retain a similar role in the political process.
DK 510.763.S247 2007
ISBN 978-0-203-40766-3
Richard Sakwa needed to exculpate his sin (stating, with many caveats and excuses, that something positive can be possible in Russia), so he produced second edition of his book, re-written in extremely disdainful and haughty manner. He also purged the second edition of some of his rash 2004 pronouncements, for instance, that Russians given their problems in Chechnya look with shock and awe at the quick and easy victory achieved by American military in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The author, like the rest of the Kremlinologist tribe, uses oral sources only from fringe opposition groups: views of mainstream journalists or politicians are not given any credence or are dismissed as government propaganda. But these people (Kasparov, Kasyanov, etc.) perform exactly the same role vis-à-vis Russia as the pro-Moscow Communists played in the Western scene during the Cold War. I.e., for a small fee from a Big Brother, they provided informational fodder, which was subsequently recycled for domestic agitprop. In an inverted post-Cold War world, different American and EU agencies similarly pay, as they think, to dupe Russians but mainly manage to deceive their own policymakers.
Another, peculiarly Anglo-Saxon habit is to compare real conditions in Russia or other “barbarian” nations with some earthly paradise called Pepperland in Octopussy’s little garden beneath the waves, rather with similar situations in other nations, including one’s own. Nobody, who witnessed enthusiastic support by the “free media” of the Bush-Blair propaganda campaign to sell the Iraq war, must judge media freedoms in other lands as wanting.
Yet, Sakwa’s book stands above all the rest and still contains a lot of accurate information and valid insights. I can certainly agree with his conclusion that current constitutional arrangement is a stopgap measure and it may develop in different directions. Russian Constitution is 13 years old, the same age as American was at the beginning of Jefferson Presidency. Practically every state, which came out of totalitarian past (Germany, Italy, Japan) had, for the protracted period, or has “one-and-a-half” party system, moreover, the duration of this semi-monopoly was inversely proportional to the level of development of democratic institutions before the dictatorship. The near future of Russian political system will depend on whether Russia’s Unity will retain a similar role in the political process.
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, 2007
Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, 2007
ISBN-10 0-231-13510-6
Cirincione presents uninspired, pedestrian account of issues. However, it is reasonably short, accurate and comprehensive. So if your purpose is to have quick-n’ dirty grasp of the subject of nuclear weapons, proliferation and disarmament, this is your book. But do not expect deep insights or fresh thoughts from it. The author correctly identifies main proliferation problem with civilian nuclear facilities, rather than with mythical Russian scare. His suggestion to reduce nuclear forces of USA and Russia to 600 warheads is unrealistic.
On p. 79 he writes: “…Kiev has retained between 4,500 and 6,300 nuclear weapons deployed on its territory during the Cold War.” Is this accurate? He quotes himself in that regard. Figures are repetitive, e.g. Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 contain much the same information.
ISBN-10 0-231-13510-6
Cirincione presents uninspired, pedestrian account of issues. However, it is reasonably short, accurate and comprehensive. So if your purpose is to have quick-n’ dirty grasp of the subject of nuclear weapons, proliferation and disarmament, this is your book. But do not expect deep insights or fresh thoughts from it. The author correctly identifies main proliferation problem with civilian nuclear facilities, rather than with mythical Russian scare. His suggestion to reduce nuclear forces of USA and Russia to 600 warheads is unrealistic.
On p. 79 he writes: “…Kiev has retained between 4,500 and 6,300 nuclear weapons deployed on its territory during the Cold War.” Is this accurate? He quotes himself in that regard. Figures are repetitive, e.g. Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 contain much the same information.
Saturday, January 12, 2008
Daniel Lord Smail. Deep History and the Brain.
Daniel Lord Smail. Deep History and the Brain.
ISBN-10 0520252896
Disjointed bauble of an aristocratic degenerate—in the medical sense I mean, of his private morals I know nothing—whose thought wanders through a schizophrenic haze with apparent erudition but no particular direction. Harvard, where he is Professor of History, obviously has some affirmative action program for well-bred and mentally handicapped faculty. But, alas, in the approaching New Gilded Age, Harvard, Princeton, Yale, etc. are quickly turning into the bastions of class privilege where scions of Washington, Hollywood and Wall Street royalty can mingle with each other at a blissful distance from working stiffs. D.L.S. is a fit teacher for them.
ISBN-10 0520252896
Disjointed bauble of an aristocratic degenerate—in the medical sense I mean, of his private morals I know nothing—whose thought wanders through a schizophrenic haze with apparent erudition but no particular direction. Harvard, where he is Professor of History, obviously has some affirmative action program for well-bred and mentally handicapped faculty. But, alas, in the approaching New Gilded Age, Harvard, Princeton, Yale, etc. are quickly turning into the bastions of class privilege where scions of Washington, Hollywood and Wall Street royalty can mingle with each other at a blissful distance from working stiffs. D.L.S. is a fit teacher for them.
Friday, January 4, 2008
Andrew Hussey, Paris: The Secret History, Bloomsbury, 2007
Andrew Hussey, Paris: The Secret History, Bloomsbury, 2007
ISBN-13 978-1-59691-323-3
One can easily recommend some book because of its solid judgment and few errors. It is another matter altogether to be fascinated by the book despite its obvious failings. And this book is fascinating indeed. This is a popular history of Paris as a living being, mostly chronological, but unsystematic and anecdotal; I could not tear myself from it for several days. This was also probably the only book in so many years I read in an (almost) consecutive fashion: from the beginning to an end.
Hussey’s book contains many lapses of judgment. For instance, its author does not seem to care about modern architecture preferring old slums with “character” and other sentimental stuff; as another Parisian, probably Charles Nodier once quipped: “During the times of Voltaire even educated people thought that a gazebo in a fake Greco-Roman style had style, while the Notre Dame did not.” He obviously does not think much of scientists and engineers as well because the contributions of Parisians to scientific or technical progress are practically absent from the book. Not so of homosexuals whose progress is specifically outlined in every other chapter; and similar to the Jews, who are mentioned only as nameless targets of persecution, while their cultural and economic contributions to the city are omitted. Without a slightest tint of disapproval Hussey provides a lengthy quote of XIX Century American journalist who uses a racial slur to describe an Afro-American transplant to Paris. Slightly less troubling is his routine tutelage of young, sexually active women as “whores.”
The author shares strange French adoration of L.-F. Séline though the man was an utter shit as personally repugnant as his Nazi views were inhumane; Jean Genet is rashly called the “enemy of all authority” (obviously not the Gestapo, association with which he flaunted long before it became safe again). Marquis de Gallifet is nicknamed by him a “sadistic dandy” for the dapper General’s role as a butcher of Paris Commune in 1871. Forgotten is the General’s achievement, as a French Minister of War, in creating professional and de-politicized French Army. Finally, the seat of Yaroslav the Wise, the Grand Prince of the Kievan Rus and Henry I father-in-law is called “an old Ukrainian city” about as accurately as it would be to call J. Caesar “an Italian dictator” or Cleopatra “an Arab princess.”
Yet, for all its defects, “Paris” is a wonderful read.
ISBN-13 978-1-59691-323-3
One can easily recommend some book because of its solid judgment and few errors. It is another matter altogether to be fascinated by the book despite its obvious failings. And this book is fascinating indeed. This is a popular history of Paris as a living being, mostly chronological, but unsystematic and anecdotal; I could not tear myself from it for several days. This was also probably the only book in so many years I read in an (almost) consecutive fashion: from the beginning to an end.
Hussey’s book contains many lapses of judgment. For instance, its author does not seem to care about modern architecture preferring old slums with “character” and other sentimental stuff; as another Parisian, probably Charles Nodier once quipped: “During the times of Voltaire even educated people thought that a gazebo in a fake Greco-Roman style had style, while the Notre Dame did not.” He obviously does not think much of scientists and engineers as well because the contributions of Parisians to scientific or technical progress are practically absent from the book. Not so of homosexuals whose progress is specifically outlined in every other chapter; and similar to the Jews, who are mentioned only as nameless targets of persecution, while their cultural and economic contributions to the city are omitted. Without a slightest tint of disapproval Hussey provides a lengthy quote of XIX Century American journalist who uses a racial slur to describe an Afro-American transplant to Paris. Slightly less troubling is his routine tutelage of young, sexually active women as “whores.”
The author shares strange French adoration of L.-F. Séline though the man was an utter shit as personally repugnant as his Nazi views were inhumane; Jean Genet is rashly called the “enemy of all authority” (obviously not the Gestapo, association with which he flaunted long before it became safe again). Marquis de Gallifet is nicknamed by him a “sadistic dandy” for the dapper General’s role as a butcher of Paris Commune in 1871. Forgotten is the General’s achievement, as a French Minister of War, in creating professional and de-politicized French Army. Finally, the seat of Yaroslav the Wise, the Grand Prince of the Kievan Rus and Henry I father-in-law is called “an old Ukrainian city” about as accurately as it would be to call J. Caesar “an Italian dictator” or Cleopatra “an Arab princess.”
Yet, for all its defects, “Paris” is a wonderful read.
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