When David Holloway's "Stalin and the Bomb" appeared in early 90s, it was nothing but revolutionary. Despite limited information at the time, from the studies of the Soviet war plans, he basically concluded that the post-war occupation of Eastern Europe and communization of its politics was, to a large extent, a realpolitik answer to the US nuclear dominance rather than ideological construct. Soviet leaders simply wanted to extend strategic depth to the degree when any nuclear attack on the USSR would mean the end of the European civilization, the price Truman and Eisenhower were not willing to pay. Stalin and the Bomb was mostly positively reviewed though there were some neocons criticizing him for his portrayal of Soviet leaders as rational political actors.
Current US media and academic orthodoxy requiring depiction of the Russians as bumbling idiots or cartoon villains and the Americans as knights in shining armor did not spare a researcher even with the stature of Holloway. Any realistic description of Israeli policies is forsworn. Every chapter must end with a moral lesson showing the inherent superiority of the West.
Consequently, US and UK policy debates and actions showing contemporary contradictions and missteps are almost absent from his 600 pp. book. Israel, whose nuclear policy was strenuously opposed by all US administrations before Nixon, is given only three short pages. Other nuclear states fare better but only slightly. China, for instance, is discussed only in the context of worsening Sino-Soviet relations with perfunctory place given to the US concerns about Chinese (and others) nuclear weapons.
In fact, during the Cold War, there were a lot of similarities between US and USSR. Both great powers had coincident interests during the Suez crisis in 1956. They, and two other European nuclear powers, were sharply opposed to West Germany acquiring nuclear weapons. Both detested idea of a separate NATO nuclear deterrent. After some vacillations, US policy makers basically accepted Soviet view on the need to keep nuclear weapons in a separate category from all others. Their views on China, India and Pakistan's nuclear programs were more nuanced but mostly compatible.
Hysterical anti-Russian bias, now universal in Western media (an old example), required Holloway to turn to the sources, such as the memoirs of Soviet defectors and dissidents who had likely to adapt to the Western publishing milieu (or their handlers) and must be treated with caution. Out of five endorsements on the cover of his book, two belong to Ukrainian nationalists (attempts of post-Soviet Ukraine to acquire nuclear weapons is a big story in itself). Saying all that, Holloway is incomparable to other US political scientists in his observational probity, technical competence, and when prevailing ideology and unimpeachable cult of Reagan and Thatcher (and Dulles, though nobody remembers him now) does not cloud his judgement, his book provides a broad prospective of nuclear issues.