The growth of inequality in the US is confirmed by all statistical metrics and there is a significant discussion as to what to do with it (or whether it is a new normal). Very thick, 700-pages volume on this subject by Thomas Piketty became a bestseller—a rarity for political economy.
Yet, there is a surprisingly little discussion of why it is bad. Inequality can be compared with obesity or climate change—when asked what system of organism/society suffers from it—the answer is “all”, so few take it seriously.
Certainly, there are anecdotal examples of heavily overweight sedentary alcoholics living past ninety and health and fitness jocks croaking at half that age. But, on the average, damage to one’s health from excessive weight is undisputable. Because the discussion of particular damage to society by extreme inequality inevitably runs as the analogue of the above example, I only remind the sticky end to which extremely unequal societies (further EUS) eventually succumbed through human history.
First, it seems that nearly all EUS become excessively militarized. Why the universal result of EUS is militarization is beyond the scope of discussion of my column and is better left to professional historians. Probably, there are many economic and cultural causes working in the same direction. The most obvious is that extreme prosperity enjoyed by the EUS elites attracts outsiders: not always in terms of invasions but also resettlement. Germanic tribes, which terrorized Europe for the next millennium, initially appeared in the Roman Empire as settlers flying from Hun and Avar depredations (don’t tell this to Donald).
The twentieth century brought with it picture of mass upheavals as workers and peasants marching with rifles under red banners. This picture is outdated, nor was it the prevalent mode of internal/class conflict in human history. Currently, we observe mass migration from the war-torn Middle East to Western Europe. There is also small, but measurable flux of “migrants” from developed countries to the Middle East, to join ISIS and other extremist groups. These volunteers predominantly grew up in conditions of wealthy secular societies, yet they stream to the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia to fan the flames of the civil wars bound to bring more huddled masses to the European shores. Thus, peaceful resettlement and armed uprising walk hand in hand.
“Militarization” should not be understood narrowly as a numerical growth of an army. For instance, European medieval society which replaced exemplary EUS of the Roman Empire was probably, one of the most militarized societies in history, given that most administrative, economic and even some ecclesiastical functions (think of armed monastic orders) were performed by armored cavalrymen. Yet they were puny, not only in absolute numbers but also in proportion to the overall population.
Militarization of the US police does not require special explanation beyond a single word: “Ferguson.” Police imitates military techniques and equipment and eventually begins to treat general population as an occupied enemy to be controlled rather than citizenry whom they must protect.
Militarization of intelligence services requires slightly more comment. Traditionally intelligence operated under makeshift rules but resorted to deadly violence very sparingly. On the contrary, the whole purpose of uniformed military is to kill opponents. However, during the centuries, the armies developed extensive rules and rituals, which are supported by elaborate command structures and draconian punishments for noncompliance. An alternative would be Late-Medieval-Early Modern European warfare or many modern African conflicts. Fictionalized portrayal can be gleaned from the “Game of Thrones.” I.e. these armies were gangs of looters and rapists who occasionally participated in combat. I remind those, who think it is an irrelevant ancient history that the Third Amendment to the US Constitution—part of the school program—is a relic of the jolly times when quartering of own troops was scarcely less a misfortune than a foreign occupation.
Current involvement of CIA in the drone warfare and other military-style special ops completely blurred the distinction between lawless but relatively non-violent professional intelligence and rule-abiding violence by the organized military. Henceforth, I will refer to “the military” as a term not relating exclusively to the uniformed army but also to the whole plethora of paramilitary organizations flourishing on the body of EUS.
At the second stage of unraveling, a captain or general of these armed forces suddenly decides that instead of him serving fat cats, they might be serving him. One helpful hint being provided that in the EUS, the (constantly fighting) military remains the only ladder for social advancement. Napoleonic habit of putting hands behind his tunic, ostensibly to hide his worn gloves in the military school provided him a subtle reminder of his inferior class origins for all his life.
In the modern American society wealth and power became the only criterion of social success. And everyone who is not constantly on the TV screen is a “loser.” It was not always that way. Obviously, in the 60s, A secretive NASA researcher or nuclear physicist possessed higher social prestige than a banker or a stand-up comedian. Moreover, banker's salaries (compared to the rocket scientist and laughable by the modern standards) were considered kind-of compensation considered tedium of the former and exciting character of work of the latter.
In their time and age, Newton and Voltaire were independently wealthy—mostly from market speculations and not from their writings —but Leibnitz, Kant and Mendelsohn, being of modest means-- were nevertheless treated as a minor royalty. Especially, when material wealth gets intertwined with an elite education—predominantly with the degrees from a top dozen schools in business, law, political sciences or communications—a constantly fighting military provides the only opportunity for the ambitious members of the lower classes to advance.
The third stage of this power play may be different though the not-always-exclusive scenarios below provide some guidance.
• Generals succeed in hanging on to power. Napoleon’s example produced several hundred of his imitators not only in Latin America but also in other parts of the world.
• The populace, usually after a period of anarchy, buoyed by disgruntled soldiery from the lost wars, overthrows the generals and instead declares loyalty to the group of extremist ideologues (Russia—1917-1922, Germany—1918-1933, China—1911-1949). This scenario may yet realize in Iraq and Syria.
• Organized state completely dissolves into sections of the competing armed gangs—a scenario favored by Hollywood anti-utopias. Contemporary examples are Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and large swaths of Pakistan, Southern Sudan and Eritrea.
Now, take your pick.
