Control over weapons in outer space

Control over the weapons in outer space


“…Your editorial is mostly an opinion, not a well-demonstrated case study… The US is not the only one contemplating such a move [i.e. the offensive weapons in space—A. B.]. Our military and society now depend on satellites, and we can ill afford a “space Pearl Harbor.” Finally, monitoring any satellite militarization is extremely difficult.”

From the letter to “Scientific American”, 12/2005 by Alan Bertaux



A usual argument of the philosophical opponents of the arms control is that a given kind of weapons is impossible to verify. Typically, this is a deliberate falsehood; for instance, the opponents of control over the biological weapons were stumbling over the USSR’s opposition to the random on-site inspections. However, after USSR collapsed and all inspection protocols were agreed upon, in mid-90s, American opponents of the BWT derailed it by insisting on the immunity of most US biological production facilities and research centers from inspections. Yet, in 1990s, unlike the 1960s, the US Senate had much less common sense. Then it dismissed Teller’s suggestions that the Test Ban Treaty was impossible to verify, because USSR can conduct nuclear tests undetectably on the far side of the Moon, or behind the Sun, in another version.
This falsehood is perpetuated with respect to the weapons in the outer space on the same grounds of verification impossibility. While, one must recognize that no particular verification system is fool-proof, one, as this was the case with Iraq’s WMDs, can achieve practical degree of assurance where undetected violations are either insignificant or will be detected before they come to deployment of any practical weapons system.
Control over the space assets is greatly aided by the fact, that the number of space launching sites is very limited, much more so than, e.g. the number of nuclear reactors, and all launches are reliably detected by the modern radar and optical technology. Even in the future, when private spaceports may appear, their licensing can be made contingent on compliance with basic universal rules. Then, combination of on-site monitoring teams, prohibition to scramble launching telemetry and randomized inspections can be successfully used for detecting non-compliance with a treaty.
Another issue, frequently appearing with respect to the space weapons is the difficulty to distinguish a space vehicle with or without offensive weapons or offensive weapons components on board. This is hard, though not improbable in space (see below), yet on Earth, the inspectors can rely on the number of obvious clues and the proverbial learning curve: intelligent human inspectors quickly learn where to look for violations. The suspicious signatures may include:

• Excessive size or weight of the satellite with respect to a declared mission;
• The elements of maneuverability inconsistent with a declared mission;
• Presence of sensors inconsistent with a mission;
• Energy consumption requirements or the size of energy sources far in excess that is usually demanded for a similar mission;
• Undeclared or unexplained devices and assemblies on board;
• Installation of certain inherently suspect devices, such as high-powered lasers or microwave emitters;
• Armoring of the satellite or the elements of stealth.

Some of the space vehicles can legitimately emit nuclear radiation because of the isotope power sources or nuclear reactors on board. Yet, modern sensors partly developed as a response to cross-border terrorism, can detect the emission spectrum or internal placement of fissionable material with enough accuracy to exclude the presence of the nuclear weapons on board.
The potential cheaters could claim that they are not as sophisticated as their opponents in miniaturization of components, or in reducing energy consumption of legitimate on-board equipment. However, as is the case with all detective work, this is the compound weight of the clues, which creates a conviction of violation. If negotiated protocols are sensible, the satellites left “in strong suspicion” by the on-site commissions, can be also launched, but it would effectuate a more stringent monitoring regimen vis-à-vis suspect objects. Also, in negotiating a treaty, leading space powers can impose the restrictions on the ability to service and retrieve suspect satellites while in orbit.
The on-the-orbit monitoring can include compliance of the parameters of the orbit with the declared mission, independent control over the maneuvers of the space vehicle, independent or collective monitoring of the electromagnetic emissions from the satellite (frequency range, energy, time characteristics). Further development of infrared technology can allow independent monitoring of the heat balance of the satellite and, hence, verify its energy consumption. Finally, a flag-raising event may be an ability of a satellite to fly in formations.
None of the proposed measures compromise military satellites with legitimate non-offensive functions, such as optical and electronic reconnaissance, radar or lidar monitoring, global positioning, communications and early warning. All their military secrets will be safely hidden in the software on their microchips. Because the functioning of US civilian economy and armed forces relies on the satellites more than any other nation, physical and informational security of these satellites is much more important than the elusive goals of threatening Earth from space.