Thursday, January 24, 2013

M. Orem. Six Days War of 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East



This review of Orem’s book was contemporary with its publication in 2007; my current comments will be posted in the end.

His is a brilliant book; but not because of its exposition of Israeli-Arab conflict or the Six Day War, but in precision of his calculation of the intended American audience.
            Imagine a worldview of the grown-up and ageing Greyer (“Nanny’s diaries”): a graduate of elite prep school and an Ivy League University, a reader of “The Wall Street Journal” and, occasionally, a “New Yorker.” This type populates different boards of trustees responsible for invitations to high powered lecture circuit. That is, he is well predisposed towards Israel and considers United States a pillar of the Universe. England is “the Old Country”, for which he feels a kind of condescending nostalgia unless, of course, its leadership disagrees with the US.  The Russians are unwashed barbarians, who are wrong in everything they are doing or not doing; French generally stink but not as much as Russians. War, of which Tom Clancy is a main source, is a glorious affair in which never-failing technology of the West always triumphs against imbecility and backwardness of the East. This gentleman is well-traveled but rarely ventured outside of five star hotels and Michelin-rated restaurants whether in Monaco or in Mumbai. (I wrote this in 2007 but now I am shuddering: I described Mitt Romney.)
            Orem’s book genially fits into this worldview practically assuring its author the status of a talk circuit superstar. Only a weary reader like this one can notice some discrepancies. Orem’s vindictive book vilifies Abba Eban and Moshe Dayan, to the lesser extent. He pretty much removed IDF Chief of Staff Rabin from his storyline. Orem bases his observations exclusively on opinions of Col. Lior, a military adjunct to Prime Minister Eshkol. Only religious conservatives, hardliners and settlers exist in Orem’s vision of Israeli history.
            But even this sketchy performance confirms some pertinent observations. First, in 1967 Johnson (and US) position towards Israel was rather ambivalent and differed little from the position of the USSR, which Orem variously blames for instigating the war and for desiring that Arabs do not provoke a larger conflict. Johnson, tied up in Vietnam War, was worried more about Jewish vote in the US and visceral anti-Semitism of the State Department of the time. French and British simply abandoned Israel, yet Orem lays no blame with the British, who also supported Jordan, one of the combatants on the Arab side.
            Soviet bitterness with Israel and the subsequent cessation of diplomatic relations resulted not from the Israel waging war per se. When USA and USSR put all their diplomatic influence on the line by twisting the hands of Israel and Jordan (USA) and the Soviets—with the Syrians, Dayan initiated an offensive against Syria. This, in Soviet view, was a wanton betrayal of mutually agreed obligations. Unbeknownst to the Soviets, Dayan also double-crossed Johnson and Eshkol, who feared that too much occupied territory will only complicate a future peace settlement.
            Many other books (e.g. Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time) tell the story of the Six Days War more convincingly and some are much shorter. But none will approach Orem’s intimacy with the thinking of the Greyers.



1 comment:

Alex Bliokh (A. S. Bliokh) said...

I wrote this review when the paperback of Orem’s book was just out. I could not foresee that Netanyahu will appoint Orem the Ambassador to the United States because of this book. The community with whom he feels most uncomfortable is the American Jews in their entirety except for the few tycoons. His favorite echo chamber is the neocons and Christian Biblical literalists who expect Armageddon in the Middle East to unleash the Second Coming.
A similar case of outsized career rise resulting from a bizarre single accident was described in Count Witte’s memoir when he described an early career of a Vice Roy of the Far East, Alexeev, who was one of the culprits of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and Russia’s defeat. Namely, when one of the (recently married) Grand Dukes in a company of naval officers instigated a brawl in a brothel near the French port city of Toulon, a young officer told the French police that he initiated the brawl and was mistaken for the Grand Duke because his last name was similar to the second name of the Tsar’s cousin, Alexeevich. Since then, the career of the naval officer took a meteoric rise. But, adds Witte, neither him, nor the Grand Duke could foresee the elevation of a worthless toady courtier to the position of the Vice Roy of one of the largest and strategically important regions of Russia.