Lieven had to exculpate his sins of writing something positive about Russia ("Russia against Napoleon") in the eyes of British academia. So he embarked on writing a political pamphlet, which predicts imminent Russian collapse--another time--if it dares not to capitulate to Anglo-American compact on Ukraine. His new book is an erudite but pointless polemic dressed up as a historical study.
The preface illustrates a "straw man" argument so beloved by the English. Lieven speaks of "bad choice" of the rulers of the Russian Empire to begin the war with Germany as the Empire was not ready. In August 1914, the only choice for the Russian military leadership was to start war with the Central Powers immediately with France and England in the field, or wait until France will be defeated and BEC evacuated from the Continent. He supports his argument by a memo by Admiral Grigorovich suggesting (correctly) that the Russian Baltic Fleet was no match for the Germans. Yet, the brave admiral was pointing that in connection with his inability to protect St. Petersburg from naval bombardment by German dreadnoughts, which never materialized, because of treacherous Baltic waters even in the darkest days of 1917. Nor the successful German assault on Riga relied on the naval power to any extent.
Lieven's description of motives and handling of the British foreign policy and the conduct of the war before and during the First World War is a Polyanny-ish description worthy of foreign policy Pravda editorials during late Brezhnev. As a British liberal arts professor, he is particularly inept in qualitative, statistical matters.
While prosecution of the war by the Russian generals was pathetically inept, the handling of the war by everyone else was not much better. In particular, British losses during the Great War were 60% of the Russian Empire's--not counting Aussies, Canadians and New Zealanders--yet, except disaster at Gallipoli, UK fought only Germany and Turkish irregulars in the Middle East. In contrast, Russia fought on the three full-blown theaters: Austro-Hungarian, German and Turkish. Statistics of losses alone hardly justifies his elevated opinion of the British high command.
His strongest suite is as usual, is ethnic relations among elites. Lieven correctly identifies Tsars/Stalin's desire to attach Galicia and Transcarpathia to Russian Novorossia and to create "Ukraine" out of them as a monumental stupidity. However, Austro-Hungarian drive to Balkans and encouragement of "Ukrainian" nationalism was equally stupid. If Ukrainians could secede from the Russian Empire, what could prevent Hungarians, Czechs and Croats to secede from Austria? And they did.
Some of his off-hand remarks are pretty silly. For instance, he suggests that Germany "was destined to win the war." Nothing can be further from the truth. Churchill correctly said that "Russia fell on its face in a step from victory." By the end of 1917, human and material resources of Germany were largely exhausted, not to speak of its shambolic allies (Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey). Yet, the resources of British, Russian Empires and the US were barely touched. In fact, once the war turned from a German-planned Blitz to the war of attrition, only gross errors of the Allies and the avoidance of these by the Central Powers, could help victory of the latter.
All in all, the Great War demonstrated a simple fact--namely, that in the industrial age of mass armies, land empires with semi-feudal militaristic elites in charge of foreign policy (Austro-Hungary, Germany, Ottoman Empire and Russia) were unsuitable ways to organize society. And they all collapsed.
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One of the examples of dangers pursuing a political scientist in the field of amateur history is his belief in "Durnovo memorandum," an obvious apocrypha. This document, predicting socialist revolution in Russia, and another revolution in Germany after the war is a fodder of neocon historians (no less authority than R. Pipes vouched for its authenticity). Strangely, though, that Durnovo, for all his imagined prescience also complied with the grammar rules, which appeared well after his death in 1915! Not to remember smallish things: he forgets his own title, etc. etc.
Tsar had his Bar Mitsvah taken.
Another grotesque feature of the "Durnovo Memorandum" is its name. The Tsars read memoranda about as frequently as they visit bar mitsvahs, i.e. never. The forgers did not realize that the word memorandum in contemporary bureaucratic usage had meaning much more specific a present-day English "memo." If the forgers ineptly translated Russian word 'zapiska' as memorandum using Russian-English vocabulary, they also should have known that tsars could have received 'zapiski' only from their mistresses whom Durnovo was not. This word, more accurately 'docladnaya zapiska' also existed in the Russian bureaucratic lexicon but had very specific meaning as well.
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