ISBN-13: 978-0-275-99190-6
Author asserts that military organizations are intrinsically conservative and process- rather than results-oriented and that all innovation comes from “military mavericks” acting on suggestions from academic pundits. Very well may be, but is unrestrained innovation always positive? Speer’s tenure at the Nazi Ministry of Armaments, Ogarkov-Ustinov tandem in USSR between 1976 and 1985 and Ramsfeld’s stewardship of the DoD shows that too much of effected change can be quite disastrous. Despite all differences in the above three situations, all were characterized by multiplication of ultra-modern, for the times, and ultra-expensive and resource-intensive weapon systems, which were too unreliable, did not fit into tactical planning or could not be produced in sufficient quantities to produce desired influence on the outcome of the conflict.
My verdict: clever, but unconvincing defense of Ramsfeldianism.
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