Response to an English friend on the question: “What is Putin up to now?” The letter composed in Nov. 2007
US State Department at any given time has only one template for installing pliable governments, a.k.a. puppets. Between 1910s and 1970s this template was to pay the generals to change the government of some Latin American or Asian country they decided to bless in this way.
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Response to an English friend on the question: “What is Putin up to now?” The letter composed in Nov. 2007
US State Department at any given time has only one template for installing pliable governments, a.k.a. puppets. Between 1910s and 1970s this template was to pay the generals to change the government of some Latin American or Asian country they decided to bless in this way.
After the Cold War, this template changed. American diplomats and CIA people organize fringe elements, which declare next elections “fraudulent,” in particular, because these fringe groups did not win. The next stage is pogrom of the government buildings, driving out the government officials and installation of the “democratic, progressive” candidate(s) who then confirm themselves in “free and fair” elections. These elections are quickly given clean bill of health (in essence, pre-approved) by the US and their allies (for instance, Mr. Saakashvili supposedly took 96% of the popular vote). Further excesses such as annulment of subsequent elections, outlawing of the opposition and direct presidential rule do not count as long as the puppet suits Washington. In spring 2007, Ukrainian President Yuschenko disbanded the parliament and the courts and never quite assembled them despite new elections according to his own rules. The only existing power structure in the present-day Ukraine is his personal apparatus. This may seem agreeable for Washington, but economics in such conditions usually experiences a free fall and 55 m. citizens of Ukraine cannot be fed entirely through foreign aid like Albanians or Georgians. The next bad crop will probably drive the country to the brink of starvation.
The above scenario nicknamed “color revolutions” was implemented in 1995 in Bulgaria, in 2000 in Serbia, as well as in Montenegro, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Not that the State Department/CIA has always succeeded. In Uzbekistan, President Karimov suppressed his own version of the “color revolution” by the iron fist. Immediately, Washington and EU noticed his violations of human rights, which he obviously scrupulously observed for the previous 15 years of his one-man rule. This was not the only mishap.
In Kyrgyzstan, tribal groups replaced one another with little change in that country’s policy. In Serbia, the US and EU tried to force through the throats of their creatures more or less a complete liquidation of their country and the internal compact between the victors quickly dissolved. In Hungary, right-wing fanatics suddenly backed down probably after increased promises by the Hungarian Government to the State Department to be good girls and boys.[1] When I talked to you in 1998 on the eve of NATO expansion I told that this means turning US into a colonial power with typical colonial set of priorities not so different from mid-XIX century Britain.
The same scenario was obviously set in store for Russia, though there it is not much fodder for it: all countries in which US could engineer a coup already were in economic shambles or deeply divided along ethnic or religious lines. [2] However, a continuing existence of groups bent on spreading public disorder such as Limonov’s “National Bolsheviks” (the strike force of Kasparov’s movement) is worrisome despite their spectacular lack of popularity and rejection by all mainstream opposition parties. [3] Thence, Putin tries to send a signal that, even if new elections will be accompanied by Demshiza violence, at no time there will be a Ukrainian-style vacuum of authority. [4] By his recent pronouncements Putin simply wants to tell to friend and foe that at any given moment until a newly elected president takes power he, as a recognized national leader will be in charge of police, Army and security forces and thus forestall potential troublemakers. My only fear is that he/she will not be as firm as Yeltsin in 93 to suppress a rebellion if necessity arises. The very vagueness of his suggestions what he wants to do after that: to become a PM, a leader of the ruling party or the speaker of the lower house and with 70% approval rating all options are open, indicates that, apart from assuring orderly elections, he is not sure himself.
Unwittingly, harebrained schemes of the State Department and the CIA played into accumulation of the authority of the central government. [5] If the situation around ’08 elections were as peaceful as in past two elections, Putin would, for the time (he is eligible for 2012), retire into public diplomacy sphere as did W. Clinton and A. Gore.
One thing, though, can be guaranteed. In Russian Constitutional system there is no such possibility that the next President will be a figurehead with Mr. Putin pulling strings behind, at least not much more, than, for instance, Dick Cheney retaining his behind-the-scenes power if ’08 president will be Republican. However, it will be in the best interest of any next President of Russia to show Putin as much public deference as his/her position would allow. Were it not for Reagan’s obvious senility, Republican Party would much more prominently display him at the meetings long past 1988 and use him as a fundraiser, and Putin is yet far from the Reagan’s years.
[1] Even the Third Reich had its own foul-ups within its domain. Before the Second World War, another Romanian putsch turned local clients of the SS and Wehrmacht upon each other with the Fuhrer grudgingly deciding in favor of the Army. In Yugoslavia, Nazi-installed Ustasha Croats demonstrated such skills in plunder and genocide that Mussolini armed and supported pro-Allied Serbs to be able to feed his own occupation army from the land.
[2] In Russia, the call to arms in favor of Georgian-style freedom and Ukrainian prosperity is met with uniform laughter.
[3]Their scuffles are widely reported by the Western media with the caveat that police is as frequently called upon to defend them from the citizenry as to disperse their mobs. The most offended party is the truck and limo drivers (a rough and quick-tempered bunch) upset at their blocking of public highways.
[4]Demshiza = Democracy + schizophrenia, Russian nickname of American-sponsored extremist and marginal groups styled on the Serbian “Pora” (Enough!) or Ukrainian “Opora” (Foundation). Another nickname is Liberasts. I suspect that most members have no political agenda of their own and participate in public disorders for the promises of visas, college scholarships and “green cards” in the West.
[5] This is similar to dissolution of Yukos, Khodorkovsky’s oil company. Initially, the Russian Government had no intentions to take it over and hired Deutsche Bank to advise on its sale to private investors. However, lawsuits filed by Khodorkovsky’s agents in the US and UK against Deutsche Bank precluded its orderly sale and forced Gazprom to absorb it under the cover of sovereign immunity. Thus, effective nationalization of Yukos, which was not originally planned, happened because the US and EU courts encourage frivolous lawsuits against Russian interests. One of these extant court orders in Texas demands Russian Government to compensate heirs of the German piano-maker in St. Petersburg whose business folded as a result of the World War I.
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